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THE IRONY OF CAMPBELL v. JONES: TO LERA TING 
SLANDER IN THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
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ABSTRACT 
In determining whether the defence of qualified privilege should shield 
defamatory comments from liability, Canadian courts must assess many 
contextual factors that aim to strike an appropriate balance between the 
right to free expression and the protection of an individual's reputation. 
This paper examines the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's decision in 
Campbell v. Jones, where the majorityfound that this privilege should 
extend to cover remarks alleging racist police motivations to the world 
at large. Chief Justice Glube and Justice Roscoe held that the two 
lawyers who made these comments had a professional responsibility to 
seek improvements to the administration of justice. This duty corre-
sponded with the general public's interest in hearing the information, 
especially given the severity of the Charter violations in the search of 
three young black girls. In contrast, the dissent of Justice Saunders 
upheld the trial judge's decision to deny the defence of qual?fzed privi-
lege, orfound, in the alternative, that the comments exceeded any such 
privilege. It is argued that the dissent 's treatment of the contentious 
issues raised by this appeal represents the more thorough and desirable 
approach. 
t James MacDuff is in his second year studying law at Dalhousie University. He seized the 
opportunity to sit in on the appeal hearing in Campbell v. Jones during the summer of 2002. 
tt LL.B. candidate 2003 - University of New Brunswick. B.A. Trent University 2000, visiting 
student at the Universitat Freiburg I 998-2000. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 24, 2002, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal released its 
highly anticipated decision on a $240,000 defamation award assessed 
the year before against prominent Halifax lawyers Anne Derrick and 
Burnley "Rocky" Jones. 1 The judgment represents the latest develop-
ment in an ongoing saga that began in 1995 and may well be destined for 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, the circumstances of the case 
offer a compelling opportunity for legal argument. The conflicting 
judgments offer two sophisticated attempts to strike the careful balance 
required between the right to free expression and the protection of an 
individual's reputation. Given the magnitude of disagreement on this 
fundamental issue between the majority and dissent at the Court of 
Appeal, these opinions are well worth scrutinizing in further detail. 
This comment will briefly state the case's overall factual back-
ground and summarize the results of the initial jury trial. Emphasis will 
be placed on the details of the press conference where the alleged 
defamation took place and also on the Charter-breaching search of the 
three young girls by Constable Carol Campbell, which initially moti-
vated Derrick and Jones to speak out. The defamation charges, insinua-
tions that Campbell's behaviour was motivated by the race and eco-
nomic status of the girls, will also be discussed. The analysis will then 
review the current Canadian jurisprudence related to the deciding factor 
in this appeal and its application by the various Justices involved. 
The trial judge's denial of the defence of qualified privilege split the 
Court of Appeal and emerged as the major focus of debate. Roscoe J .A., 
writing for the majority, held that the trial judge erred at law in not 
allowing privilege to shield Derrick and Jones from liability for any 
defamatory comments made about Campbell during their press confer-
ence. In the process, Justice Roscoe and Chief Justice Glube effectively 
rendered the findings of the jury moot. In contrast, Justice Saunders, in 
dissent, affinned the trial judge's decision on qualified privilege and 
upheld the overall award by dismissing all other grounds of appeal. 
Moreover, even if the occasion deserved the protection of privilege at 
law, Saunders J.A. ruled that the comments made by Derrick and Jones 
' Campbell v. Jones, [2002] N.S.J. No. 450 (C.A.) [Campbell]. 
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would have exceeded any legitimate purpose. His dissenting opinion 
also differed from the majority on the seriousness of the slander, the 
extent of the lawyers' obligation to ensure improvements to the admin-
istration of justice, and the degree of deference owed to the jury in 
assessing questions of fact. In its entirety, the decision of Justice 
Saunders seems more in keeping with Canadian law and the delicate and 
careful balancing of rights required by the unique circumstances of this 
case. 
Overall, however, the matter of Campbell v. Jones cannot properly 
be separated from its factual context, so this work concludes by stepping 
away from strict legal analysis and viewing the case through a broader 
societal lens. It should be noted that this case received a substantial 
amount of public attention and involved, at its core, the contentious and 
unsettling issue of police behavior toward historically disadvantaged 
sectors of society. In addition, the egregious nature of the search was 
frankly acknowledged and Constable Campbell was disciplined inter-
nally by the police force. When the shocking extent of her actions are 
viewed in combination with the sizeable defamation awarded by the 
jmy, it is reasonable to assume that the Justices on the Court of Appeal 
may have felt heightened pressure to reduce or strike down the verdict 
altogether. Amidst such controversial circumstances, is the age-old 
maxim of Oliver Wendell Holmes that "hard cases make bad law" a 
potentially valid critique of the outcome, or does the majority's apparent 
broadening of the qualified privilege defence still possess adequate 
constraints? In any event, their expansive approach does provide law-
yers with the potentially dangerous ability to make slanderous state-
ments with impunity, especially when calling attention to perceived 
injustices. 
II. FACTS 
In March of 1995, Constable Carol Campbell rep01ied to Saint Patrick's 
- Alexandra Junior High School in Halifax, Nova Scotia, to investigate 
two separate thefts. Acting in her capacity as a police officer, she 
proceeded to conduct an invasive and unconstitutional search of three 
twelve-year-old black girls who were suspected by the Vice Principal of 
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stealing $10. Constable Campbell did not advise the girls of their right to 
refuse the search or their right to counsel. She did not take appropriate 
measures to ensure their parents or guardians were contacted. Although 
the evidence regarding the search's degree of intrusiveness differs to 
some extent, at a minimum Constable Campbell conceded that she 
1sked the girls to pull their underwear away from their bodies to look for 
the money. She later admitted to the highly improper nature of this 
search and was disciplined accordingly.2 
Anne Derrick and Rocky Jones were retained by the guardians of the 
three students shortly after this occurred, and decided to file a complaint 
1gainst the officer pursuant to the Police Act.3 The lawyers held a joint 
press conference to announce the launching of their complaints and to 
relate the accusations to the general public. In doing so, they described 
the students' version of the events in factual terms, making no attempts 
to ascertain the truth of their story. Constable Campbell was never 
referred to by name, but no attempt was made to protect her identity in 
the distribution of the complaints to those in attendance. 
Ms. Derrick and Mr. Jones then responded to several questions 
posed by the media regarding the motivations underlying Constable 
Campbell's conduct during the search. When asked if a clear connection 
existed between the search and the race of the girls, Mr. Jones replied, 
" ... there is no doubt in my mind that this would not have happened to 
white children."4 He also wrote in his complaint to police that "[g]iven 
the race of all three girls and the economic class of the residents of the 
1rea in which they live and attend school, harsher and more drastic 
measures were taken than were necessary for the situation."5 Similarly, 
Ms. Derrick commented that " .. .it's quite a reasonable assumption to 
make that there's a connection between the race of the girls and their 
socio-economic status and the events that they were subjected to."6 The 
lawyers seemed most intent on addressing what they perceived as 
systemic racism, and Campbell's behavior in this particular case was 
Jffered as an example of this problem. 
v. Jones, [2001] N.S.J. No. 373 (T.D.) [Trial Decision]. Moir J's factual summary 
)f the case is found at paras. 2-7. 
; R.S.N.S. 1989 c.348. 
' Campbell, supra note 1 at para. I 5. 
' Trial Decision, supra note 2 at para. 6. 
' Trial Decision, supra note 2 at para. 6. 
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Following extensive media coverage, Carol Campbell demanded a 
retraction by Derrick and Jones. When the lawyers refused to do so, she 
initiated a defamation action against them. Her claim alleged that their 
comments, by their ordinary meaning and by innuendo, suggested she 
was racist, motivated by racism and that she performed her duties 
discriminatorily on the grounds of race, economic status and social 
status. 7 She alleged that the statements accusing her of conducting a 
"strip search" were slanderous as well. Derrick and Jones filed separate 
defences, asserting that the spoken or written words were either not 
defamatory, true matters of fact, fair comment on a matter of public 
interest, or subject to the protection of qualified privilege.8 
As a question of law, Justice Moir determined at trial that the 
Defendants could not rely on the defence of qualified privilege, prima-
rily due to the timing and widespread publication of the communication. 
The case proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict in favour 
of Constable Campbell, finding Derrick and Jones jointly liable for 
$240,000 in damages and $70,000 in costs.9 Seventeen months later, the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal overturned this decision, holding that 
Justice Moir had erred in finding that the press conference was not an 
occasion of qualified privilege. A two-one majority ruled that even if 
any serious defamatory comments were made, they should be com-
pletely protected from liability at law. 
HI. THE DEFENCE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE 
As the decisive factor at the Court of Appeal, it is necessary to briefly 
review the legal test used to determine the existence of qualified privi-
lege before proceeding to an analysis of the decisions themselves. The 
traditional rationale for this defence is grounded in the values to the 
public interest of freedom of speech, transparency, scrutiny of public 
officials, and the pursuit of truth. Its overall application derives chiefly 
from principles that "advance the common convenience and welfare of 
society." 10 Gatley further states that: 
7 Campbell, supra note I at para. 18. 
8 Campbell, supra note I at para. 19. 
9 Campbell, supra note I at para. 20. 
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In such cases no matter how harsh, hasty, untrue or libelous the 
publication would be but for the circumstances, the law declares it 
privileged because the amount of public inconvenience from the re-
striction of freedom of speech or writing would far out-balance that 
arising from the infliction of private injury. 11 
To establish that an occasion deserves the protection of qualified 
privilege, the court must carefully assess the extent of the speaker's duty 
to disseminate the information and the audience's corresponding inter-
est in receiving it. 12 By necessity, the test involves the discretionary 
weighing of numerous factors and therefore contains no simple rules. 
Brown introduces the factors necessary to determine the existence of a 
qualified privilege by stressing the difficulty of articulating clear rules 
and standards. 13 Ultimately, no "bright light test'* exists to identify 
privileged occasions with certainty. The court must simply measure the 
appropriateness of allowing the defence to succeed by evaluating a host 
of relevant factors. These factors were succinctly expressed in the 1926 
case of Sapiro v. Leader Publishing Co. Ltd: 
The Judge will consider the alleged libel, who published it, why, and 
to whom, and under what circumstances. He will also consider the 
nature of the duty which the defendant claims to discharge, or the 
interest which he claims to safeguard, the urgency of the occasion, and 
whether or not he officiously volunteered the information, and deter-
mine whether or not what has been published was germane and 
reasonably appropriate to the occasion. 15 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently affirmed this general 
test in Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co. (c.o.b. Tilnes - Colonist). 16 
In addition to the above list, Canadian jurisprudence has also en-
dorsed the position that publications to the general public make it 
extremely difficult to justify a finding of qualified privilege. 17 This 
10 Jones v. Bennett, [ l 969] S.C.R. 277 at 284 [Jones]. 
11 Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 81" ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at 441 
[emphasis added]. 
12 Osborne, Law of Torts, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 364 [Osborne]. 
13 Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 1994) vol. 
I at 670 [Brown]. 
14 Per Kooper J. in Garson v. Hendlin, 532 N.Y.S. 2d 776 at 780 (1988). 
15 (1926), 20 Sask. L.R. 449 at 453 (C.A.). 
16 [1996] B.C.J. No. 125 at para. 19 (C.A.). 
17 Osborne, supra note 12 at 365. 
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qualification derives from the initial requirement for reciprocity. Only 
in the rarest instances would the entire world have a clear interest in 
receiving a communication deserving of qualified privilege protection. 
In the 1969 case of Jones v. Bennett, the Supreme Court of Canada 
entrenched this opinion, holding that: 
.. .it must be regarded as settled that a plea based on a ground of the 
sort relied on in the case at bar cannot be upheld where the words 
complained of are published to the public generally or, as it is some-
times expressed, "to the world at large. 18 
This outright restriction on the applicability of the qualified privilege 
defence has been naITowly construed since the Jones decision. In fact, 
several Canadian courts have determined that such broad publication 
alone will not prevent the finding that an occasion deserves the protec-
tion of qualified privilege. 19 The recent House of Lords case of Reynolds 
v. Times Newspaper Ltd. 20 expressly rejected a total prohibition on a 
publication to the world at large, favouring an application of the stan-
dard approach in which the court considers the extent of the communi-
cation as merely one of the many factors to be weighed. 
In addition, a finding of qualified privilege does not provide an 
absolute shield from liability. Even if an occasion is found to be pro-
tected, the defence will be defeated if the communication is motivated 
by actual or express malice or if the limits attached to the privilege are 
exceeded. In Campbell, the trial judge initially determined that there 
was insufficient evidence to allow the question of malice to go before 
the jury, and this finding was not appealed. The Court of Appeal 
judgments do address, to varying degrees, whether the comments ex-
ceeded the privilege, so some elaboration on this issue is still important 
here. 
Osborne states conclusively that qualified privilege will cease to 
apply "in respect of defamatory statements that are not relevant to, or in 
furtherance of, the purpose for which the privilege is given."21 In Hill v. 
18 Jones, supra note 10 at 284-285. 
19 For example: Parlett v. Robinson, (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4'h) 247 (B.C.C.A.); Silva v. Toronto 
Star Newspapers Ltd. et al. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4'h) 554 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Dhami v. C.B. C., 
[2001] B.C.J. No. 2773 (Q.L.) (S.C). 
20 [1999] 4 All E. R. 609 (H.L.) See paras. 17-19. 
21 Osborne, supra note 12 at 366. 
232 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Church of Scientology,22 the Supreme Court of Canada assessed defa-
matory comments in a similar context to those at issue in Campbell: 
remarks made by a lawyer at a press conference. There the court 
considered the seriousness of the language, the extent of publication, 
and the urgency required, concluding that the scope of the remarks "far 
exceeded the legitimate purposes of the occasion. "23 Therefore, in order 
to receive the full protection of any qualified privilege defence, the 
information communicated must be relevant, pertinent, and reasonably 
appropriate in the context of all the circumstances. 
IV. THE DECISIONS 
1. Trial Judge 
Justice Moir did not fully embrace the broader view on publication to 
the world at large that the House of Lords proposed in the 1999 
Reynolds case. However, although he felt that the court should be 
strictly bound by the decision in Jones v. Bennett, he did explicitly note 
that communication to the general public would not absolutely defeat 
the defence in every instance.24 Moir J. also questioned whether the duty 
of the lawyers to call attention to Charter violations and potential faults 
in the current administration of justice was an obligation sufficient 
enough to trigger the defence. While he did emphasize the importance of 
bringing any such impropriety to light, especially for incidents involv-
ing traditionally oppressed minorities, the fact that DeITick and Jones 
had only just filed an official complaint was very significant. Moir J. 
held that the threshold in proving an appropriate duty and audience must 
be high when making serious, factual statements as to the motivation of 
Constable Campbell. Here, the defendants took no steps to verify the 
accuracy of their statements. The investigation process would begin 
shortly, a process that could lead to a public hearing and judicial 
determination. In refusing to allow the defence of qualified privilege, he 
22 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 [Hill]. 
23 Ibid. at para. 155. 
24 Trial Decision, supra note 2 at para. 29. 
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held that the "need had not yet arisen" for Derrick and Jones to call 
attention to their concerns about racial impact on police behavior to the 
world at large.25 In his opinion, the general public's interest in the 
statements had not been engaged sufficiently to outweigh society's 
interest in protecting Carol Campbell's reputation. 
2. Court of Appeal: Majority 
Justice Roscoe and Chief Justice Glube held that the trial judge erred in 
law by finding that the press conference did not satisfy the requisite test 
for qualified privilege. Their opinion criticized him for interpreting the 
precedent in Jones v. Bennett strictly, resulting in an overly stringent 
and narrow test that did not adequately assess all of the circumstances. 
The majority felt that the trial judge's reasoning placed too onerous a 
burden on publications to the world at large, a position inconsistent with 
the more recent developments recognized in Reynolds.26 They also 
determined that Moir J. placed too much emphasis on the timing of the 
publication by Derrick and Jones and assigned inordinate weight to this 
sole factor. Furthermore, in considering the circumstances, the majority 
downplayed the seriousness of the slander by referring to R. v. Golden. 27 
This Supreme Court of Canada decision, released a few months after the 
conclusion of the jury trial in Campbell, establishes a very broad defini-
tion of "strip search" in law that would apply to the actions of Constable 
Carol Campbell. Roscoe J.A. 's reasons also expressed that Moir J. 
underestimated the ethical responsibility of lawyers to speak out in the 
face of patent injustices perpetrated against their clients. The majority 
held that this duty to improve the administration of justice and uphold 
the law was entirely sufficient to ground a defence of qualified privi-
lege.28 The opinion concluded by noting that the trial judge's most 
serious oversight was his failure to give proper consideration to the 
serious Charter values and rights at the heart of this case. 29 
25 Trial Decision, supra note 2 at para. 33. 
2'' Campbell, supra note I at para. 54. 
27 [2001] S.C.J. No. 81 [Golden]. 
28 Campbell, supra note I at paras. 55-59. 
29 Campbell, supra note I at paras. 63-70. 
234 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
3. Court of Appeal: Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Saunders held that the trial judge correctly stated the 
legal test for assessing whether the defence of qualified privilege ap-
plied to the case at bar and upheld the jury's verdict by dismissing all 
other grounds of appeal. He felt that Moir J.'s reasoning did not place 
too onerous a burden on the Defendants because the publication was 
made to the whole world. Rather, in the opinion of Saunders J.A., the 
trial judge simply recognized the difficulty in proving the requirements 
of this defence when the communication is directed to such a large 
audience. His reasoning simply treated this point as a strong factor 
weighing against the Appellants in the overall circumstances. Justice 
Saunders felt this hardly created a rebuttable presumption that a quali-
fied privilege ought not to apply, as counsel for Ms. Derrick con-
tended.30 The dissenting opinion also disputed the majority's belief that 
the trial judge placed too much emphasis on the timing and urgency of 
the publication itself. In the view of Saunders J.A., the trial judge merely 
considered these issues in conjunction with all other factors. The dissent 
considered it inappropriate for an Appeal Court to substitute its own 
discretionary view as to the relative weight each element should be 
assigned. 31 This dissent also held that any duty owed by the lawyer in 
this case must be tempered by professional restraint, and that here the 
duty was fully satisfied by the filing of complaints that initiated an 
investigation into the matter.32 
Justice Saunders went on, in any event, to consider whether the 
comments would exceed any privilege that might be attached to the 
occasion. He canvassed this issue extensively, relying heavily on the 
Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in Hill. Ultimately, he 
applied Cory J. 's description of the impugned behaviour in Hill to the 
Appellants, characterizing the conduct of Mr. Jones and Ms. Derrick as 
"high-handed and careless, void of any semblance of professional re-
straint or objectivity ... grossly unfair and far exceed[ing] any legitimate 
purpose the press conference may have served."33 As well, he consid-
3° Campbell. supra note I at paras. I 09-110. 
31 Campbell, supra note I at para. 126. 
32 Campbell, supra note I at para. 179. 
33 Campbell, supra note I at para. 134. 
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ered the decision in R. v. Golden to be irrelevant in evaluating the 
seriousness of the slander. According to Justice Saunders, the jury must 
be left to detennine whether a "strip search" occurred by deciding 
questions of credibility on the evidence. The jury ought then compare 
any allegedly defamatory comments with their own evaluation of the 
facts, not with a legal definition of the term as used in criminal cases. 34 
V. DISCUSSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the approach advanced by Justice 
Saunders is more consistent with established Canadian law. Although 
the determination of qualified privilege is difficult and highly circum-
stantial, it seems Moir J. carefully considered and correctly applied the 
appropriate legal test. In the alternative, Saunders J.A. also analyzed the 
comments themselves in great depth and concluded that they would 
exceed the bounds of any privilege as per Hill. Compare this with 
Roscoe J .A.' s reasoning, which glosses over this last point in one 
paragraph without even mentioning the leading Supreme Comi of 
Canada case at issue. This telling oversight is consistent with other 
questionable aspects of a majority decision that seems more intent on 
reaching a certain outcome than evenly balancing all the factors in-
volved. This analysis will critically examine the conclusions of the 
majority with respect to four fundamental areas of disagreement: the 
legal test applied by the trial judge; the duty relied upon by the lawyers 
to ground the defence; the relevance of R. v. Golden; and whether the 
remarks would exceed any privilege. In all, the dissent of Justice 
Saunders consistently addresses these issues in a more balanced fashion, 
in keeping with the requirements of the law. 
In terms of the test for qualified privilege, Roscoe J.A. claimed that 
the trial judge placed too much significance on the broad publication of 
the remarks and imposed an unduly onerous burden on Derrick and 
Jones to meet these requirements. She emphasized that the "test. .. is the 
same whether the publication is to a few people or to the world at 
34 Campbell, supra note I at para. 144. 
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large."35 Reading over Moir J's consideration of the Jones v. Bennett 
precedent, he clearly does stress the size of the audience as a factor 
"indicating strongly against qualified privilege."36 However, this seems 
to be more in keeping with a logical recognition ofreality. The defence 
of qualified privilege is rarely applied to communications that extend to 
such a widespread audience. Consider the wording used by Brown in his 
significant review of this aspect of law: "[p ]ublication to a newspaper 
directly may be considered publication to the world, and, generally, will 
have the effect of defeating a qualified privilege ... a court's conclusion, 
however, may be affected by the circumstances of the case."37 Nothing 
in this type of language denotes the application of a different test. It is a 
simple acknowledgement that the size of the group receiving the com-
munication is an issue of fundamental importance.38 It should be noted 
that the trial judge reviewed numerous cases in his analysis and also 
duly considered the other factors involved. Seen in this light, the distinc-
tion drawn here by Roscoe J.A. appears to involve concern over seman-
tics as opposed to the development of a different standard by Moir J. 
The majority also criticized the strong focus placed on urgency in 
the trial judge's test for qualified privilege. Roscoe J.A. held that 
inordinate weight was placed on this particular factor. She also cited 
Parlett v. Robinson39 to reinforce the position that if defendants main-
tain a reasonable belief that going public is the only effective way to 
ensure their concerns are addressed, then the issue of timing may well 
cease to be problematic. Roscoe J.A. neglects to mention that in Parlett 
the court explicitly noted the serious attempts made to exhaust other 
avenues before commenting to the world at large.40 Here, the circum-
stances of the press conference were well outlined by Justice Moir and 
Justice Saunders. They each emphasized that the lawyers had already 
initiated the appropriate process for registering their complaint and 
spurring an investigation of the incident. A review was underway that 
would necessitate a response, with appropriate consequences.41 The fact 
35 Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 50. 
36 Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 53. 
37 Brown, supra note 13 at 862, 863. 
38 Campbell, supra note I at para. I I 0. 
39 (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4'") 247 (B.C.C.A.). 
40 Ibid. at para. 29. 
41 Campbell, supra note 1 at paras. 39, 179. 
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that the Defendants "moved immediately to give the broadest possible 
publicity to their allegations" while taking absolutely no steps to verify 
their accusations must be accorded some consideration in determining 
whether the defence of qualified privilege applies. 42 
The majority and the dissent disagree not only on the extent of the 
general public's interest in hearing these complaints, but also on the 
scope of the lawyer's reciprocal duty to speak out. DeITick and Jones 
argued that pursuant to their ethical duty under Chapter 21 of Legal 
Ethics and Professional Conduct, A Handbook for Lawyers in Nova 
Scotia (among other professional guidelines), they were obligated to 
make the communication because "[t]he lawyer has a duty to encourage 
public respect for justice and to uphold and try to improve the adminis-
tration of justice"43 and "[t]he lawyer, therefore, has a duty to provide 
leadership in seeking improvements to the legal system.''44 The Appel-
lants contended that they had not only the right, but the duty to call 
public attention to the Charter violations and patent injustice in this 
case. The majority held that this moral and social duty is fully sufficient 
to advance a defence of qualified privilege. 
Saunders J.A. and Moir J. did not deny this important duty to seek 
improvements to the administration of justice. Nothing in their state-
ments suggest any disagreement with the inherent value of bringing 
awareness to the Charter rights possessed by all Canadians. However, 
even the words of these guidelines suggest that a balancing must take 
place and that the obligation to improve the administration of justice is 
not unqualified. The same chapter relied upon by the majority also states 
that "in discharging this duty, the lawyer should not be involved in 
violence or injmy to the person".45 The reasoning of Justice Saunders 
goes to considerable lengths to emphasize the reasons behind the litiga-
tion: a lawsuit by Constable Campbell to protect her reputation as a 
police officer. He considered the duty of the lawyers satisfied by the 
filing of the complaint, emphasizing (as in Hill) that lawyers also have a 
professional obligation to exercise restraint.46 
42 Campbell, supra note I at para. 121 
43 (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 1990) at 93. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Campbel!, supra note I at paras. 179-181. 
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In stark contrast, the majority's decision fails to recognize that any 
existing duty to highlight Charter violations must be qualified by a 
reciprocal responsibility to ensure the statements are true or reasonable 
under the circumstances. Given the emphasis by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Hill on the fundamental importance of an individual's reputa-
tion, it is surprising that Roscoe J.A. neglected to consider the impact of 
the slander on Carol Campbell's dignity and integrity. No attempt is 
made by the majority to seek a balance between these competing inter-
ests, or to more fully articulate the injury to the person caused by the 
defamation. Although the egregious nature of the conduct being com-
mented upon deserves considerable attention, the excessive nature of 
the comments and their consequences should not be casually avoided. 
Justice Roscoe also considered the impact of R v. Golden, a Supreme 
Court of Canada case released following the conclusion of the Campbell 
trial. Although the two sides offered substantially different accounts of 
Carol Campbell's search, the legal definition of "strip search" provided 
in Golden encompasses even the actions admitted to by Campbell 
herself. Roscoe J.A. found this point relevant for assessing the defama-
tory comments, despite the fact that the jury is traditionally responsible 
for making these factual findings.47 This decision to incorporate Golden 
represents a further example of the majority's willingness to downplay 
the seriousness of libelous remarks that a jury found worthy of$240,000 
in damages. This jury, not the Court of Appeal, had the opportunity to 
hear the various witnesses, weigh all the evidence, decide which ac-
count of the search they believed, and detennine if statements asserting 
the "strip search" as fact amounted to defamation. Justice Saunders' 
decision held that the majority should have refrained from substantially 
interfering with the jury's conclusions. 
Finally, any finding of qualified privilege will be defeated if the 
limits of the duty or interest have been exceeded. In other words, the 
comt must detennine if the comments in question were "germane and 
commensurate with the occasion."48 Without considering the defama-
tory statements in much detail, Roscoe J.A. held that the remarks made 
by Jones and Derrick were relevant to the type of search and the flagrant 
Charter violations, and so were reasonably appropriate.49 In reaching 
47 Campbell, supra note I at para. 26. 
48 Hill, supra note 22 at para. 146. 
49 Campbell, supra note I at para. 72. 
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this conclusion, the majority emphasized that the lawyers had not been 
malicious, careless, or reckless and that the actions of Constable 
Campbell technically constituted a "strip search", as per Golden. Justice 
Saunders emphatically dissented from this position with a thorough 
analysis of the statements. He did not dispute the necessity of protecting 
Charter rights, taking exception only to whether the remarks themselves 
were reasonably linked to this noble purpose. Justice Saunders con-
cluded that that the accusations pertaining to the potentially racist 
motivations of Constable Campbell overstepped this boundary. 
The dissent noted that it would have been entirely possible to bring 
the treatment of the students to light, to articulate the very obvious 
Charter violations, and to publicize the official complaint without stat-
ing Constable Campbell's motivations with certainty. Note that these 
remarks were officiously volunteered and particularly damaging to 
Campbell's reputation as a public official. Furthermore, Derrick and 
Jones took no steps whatsoever to verify their opinions concerning the 
motivations of Constable Campbell, and actually admitted knowing 
nothing about her.50 Derrick and Jones had no grounds for believing that 
Campbell would perpetuate a Charter violation on discriminatory 
grounds. Saunders J.A. compared the behavior of these lawyers to the 
actions of Morris Manning, the defendant in Hill. The press conference 
convened by Mr. Manning was found to be privileged, but the Supreme 
Court placed significant weight on the fact that he immediately sought 
the "widest possible dissemination" to make his defamatory comments 
despite the eX1istence of an ongoing investigation. By portraying the 
plaintiff in "the worst possible light", Manning's comments exceeded 
any qualified privilege attached to his remarks. 51 Given the similar 
circumstances between Hill and Campbell, the majority's failure to 
mention or attempt to distinguish this recent Supreme Court of Canada 
precedent represents yet another glaring omission in their overall judg-
ment. 
5° Campbell, supra note 1 at para. 179. 
51 Hill, supra note 22 at para. 156. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the 
future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming 
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These 
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes 
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well 
settled principles of law will bend.52 
Within the law's broad and discretionary test for assessing the merits of 
a qualified privilege defence, the argument advanced by the Appellants 
and accepted by the majority in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal can be 
made. The fundamental question, however, is should such a claim 
succeed at law? If it does in this fact scenario, how does it affect the 
development and protection of the individual's interest in preserving an 
untarnished reputation? Does it give carte blanche for lawyers to speak 
with impunity, so long as the libel can be said to occur in the pursuit of 
justice? In this context, the majority's decision looks all the more 
ominous, since it fails to clarify what qualifies as an effort to improve 
the overall administration of justice. Nor does it seriously address the 
permissible scope of remarks made during a privileged occasion. In all, 
the decision fails to impose a clear limit or boundary on the amount of 
media posturing that lawyers may engage in to attract attention and 
support for their clients with erroneous allegations. Will any advocate 
who publicizes a violation of Charter rights be granted similar latitude 
to defame? 
Justice Roscoe criticizes the trial judge for making the issue of 
urgency the "centerpiece" of his judgment and not taking all the circum-
stances into account. 53 However, her opinion contains a notable slant 
toward the "patent injustice" committed against the young girls and the 
corresponding duty to inform the public of these actions, with little 
regard for the rights of Carol Campbell. Compare this with the Supreme 
Court of Canada's bold emphasis on the value of preserving individual 
reputations in Hill, reasoning conspicuously absent from the majority's 
reasonmg: 
52 Per Wendell Holmes J.'s dissent in Northern Securities Company v. United States (1904), 
193 U.S. 197 at 400-401. 
53 Campbell, supra note I at para. 62. 
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... good reputation is closely related to the innate worthiness and 
dignity of the individual. It is an attribute that must, just as much as 
freedom of expression, be protected by society's laws ... [It is] a 
concept that underlies all the Charter rights. It follows that the protec-
tion of the good reputation of an individual is of fundamental impor-
tance to our democratic society.54 
It appears ironic that in emphasizing the need to apply Charter values to 
this analysis, the actual effect of Roscoe J.A. 's position is to undermine 
the rights of individuals to their dignity and reputation, in favour of the 
public's right to be informed about potential injustices. She focuses 
heavily on the extent of the perceived injustice, without adequately 
considering the accuracy, fairness, and hann of any slanderous state-
ments in the same manner. 
The position taken by the majority might be more easily justified in 
the absence of many other defences that offer "sufficient protection" to 
lawyers who would call attention to such injustice.55 In the most obvious 
example, Derrick and Jones could have tempered their press conference 
by merely stating their opinions as fair comment on the situation, as 
opposed to defaming a person they admittedly knew nothing about with 
such serious factual accusations and stigmatizing catchphrases. 56 They 
could also have taken steps to inquire more thoroughly into the situa-
tion, or wait for the investigation to run its course. The unwillingness of 
these lawyers to retract, clarify, or apologize for such statements follow-
ing the media coverage of the press conference and the emergence of 
new facts further demonstrates their low regard for the harsh impact 
their actions might have on Carol Campbell in her public role as a police 
officer. To prevent the undennining of such an important value in the 
future, the law must contain appropriate safeguards to protect against 
the possibility of cavalier attacks on individual reputations. 
Instead, the broad application of qualified privilege tacitly rein-
forces the ability of lawyers in a similar position to publish slanderous 
remarks to the world at large, providing little incentive to exercise due 
caution and moderation. As George MacDonald, Q.C., counsel for 
Carol Campbell, remarked in his summation at trial, if discriminatory 
behavior is the harm to be remedied, countering it with the further 
54 Hill, supra note 22 at paras. I 07 and 120. 
55 Campbell, supra note l at para. 129. 
56 Campbell, supra note 1 at paras. 152 and 174. 
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stereotyping of a different group seems like a poor manner of accom-
plishing this desired goal.57 While the specific nature of the case will 
likely narrow its impact as a precedent, Canada's Supreme Court may be 
interested in hearing the case itself to reinforce the need to appropriately 
balance respective interests in such cases, especially given the length 
the majority went to in interfering with the trial judge's overall analysis. 
Taken in its entirety, the reasoning of the majority could be viewed 
as reflecting a more emotional and instinctual response to the specific 
matter at hand than the rational, systematic approach required by a legal 
system that successfully weighs competing interests evenly. Granted, 
the sense of racial tension in this area may be so gripping and the 
conduct of Constable Campbell so egregious as to warrant considerable 
sympathy for the objectives of the Appellants. Any attempt to restore 
faith in the legal system for those groups traditionally disadvantaged is 
clearly a noble and worthy cause. The question remains: should the 
pursuit of this goal come at the expense of stretching the law beyond 
certain established limits? Obviously, the scope of this comment is not a 
practical forum for discussing the historical backdrop or level of racial 
tensions that exist in society and demand rectification. It seems equally 
clear, however, that this specific litigation will not be able to fully 
address the enormity of the situation either. Although this underlying 
context must not be overlooked or easily dismissed, it should not be 
regarded as the determinative factor in this narrow defamation proceed-
mg. 
Ultimately, society must be trusted to draw appropriate inferences 
from the facts on its own, and there is no doubt that people will do so, 
especially amidst such polarizing and controversial circumstances. En-
couraging the occurrence of this type of process is much different than 
approving laws that permit the broad-based publication of mere assump-
tions as damning statements of concrete fact. Justice demands a fuller 
consideration of the individual's interest in their reputation when it is 
challenged by false or unsubstantiated slander. While the outcome of 
this decision demonstrates a noble recognition of historic wrongs and a 
commitment to their rectification, it entirely fails to recognize the grav-
ity of the damages caused by defamation and seems to bend the law on 
qualified privilege in order to compensate. If this judgment stands, it 
57 Campbell, supra note I at para. 379. 
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provides lawyers and others with an ability to make serious public 
condemnations before hearing from the victim of these attacks, or even 
verifying the basic facts. How can we hope to properly achieve justice 
by tolerating such injustice in its pursuit? Quite plainly, we cannot. 
